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
Why 116 Isn't Enough

Numbers matter. Quantity has a quality all its own. As Admiral Johnson explained at the June 1999 Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College, "Since the last Quadrennial Defense Review, I've said – and believed – that a force of 305 ships – fully manned, properly trained, and adequately resourced would be sufficient for today's requirements within acceptable levels of risk. But...the mounting evidence leads me to believe that 305 ships is not likely to be enough in the future." Indeed, the first QDR in 1997 concluded that the Navy must sustain a force of some 346 ships (not the 305 ships projected for 2003) to satisfy the operational requirements of the *National Military Strategy*. Projections show that the Navy can expect to sustain no more than about 300 ships, and the Fleet may decline even further unless additional resources are brought to bear.

Nowhere is the mismatch between requirements and reality more stark than with the "workhorses" of the U.S. Navy: the cruisers, destroyers, and frigates that are the backbone of the Fleet. The 1997 QDR resulted in a programmed force of 116 surface combatants, and yet recent surface combatant assessments conclude that **as many as 139 multi-mission warships will be required** to satisfy strategic guidance for future conflicts. Moreover, high-tempo peacetime and crisis-response operations have continued to place premiums on having sufficient numbers of combat-credible warships in key world regions. The current force projections are shown in the accompanying graphic:

Surface Combatant Force Projection

Total - 116 (108 Active & 8 NRF)



America's naval expeditionary forces – epitomized by the multimission surface warship – provide the nation with a flexible and effective instrument of security policy with which to promote stability and project power in regions of importance

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● to the United States. Forward-deployed, combat-credible surface warships are
● vitally important for shaping the global security environment and helping to assure
● access to overseas regions. Moreover, they enable timely and often the first crisis
● response – anytime...anywhere – from the sea. The ability to reassure friends
● and allies, deter potential adversaries, and engage in combat at all levels of intensity
● makes surface warships especially valuable to the nation.

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● The events of the last decade have clearly underscored that we live in an uncertain
● and still-dangerous time. While we are confident that no nation will match the
● United States on a global scale in the foreseeable future, our ability to dominate
● the world's oceans and, when required, project maritime power ashore, may
● discourage the adventurism of unfriendly regional powers and afford us the means
● to defeat them. Forward-deployed U.S. naval expeditionary forces promote stability,
● reassure allies, and provide a counterweight to the influence of unfriendly regional
● actors. Such forces contribute to a security framework that complements other
● instruments of national power to foster regional stability and peace.

Analysis combined with real-world experience demonstrates the inadequacy of the programmed surface combatant force. Six conclusions are apparent:

- The nation needs more than 116 cruisers and destroyers in the 2015 time frame to defeat any likely peer competitor.
- The wartime risk to our baseline force of 116 cruisers and destroyers is high, from both conventional and asymmetric threats.
- The need for a larger force structure is driven by peacetime forward engagement and emerging Navy wartime missions, particularly Theater Ballistic Missile Defense.
- The near-term future force must be equipped with vertical launching systems for missile capacity and response.
- The DD-21 Land-Attack Destroyer is a key, if not vital, element of the Navy's contribution to the Joint land campaign.
- Modernization of all 27 *Ticonderoga* (CG-47) AEGIS cruisers is critical to assured access in crisis and defense in conflict.

A force of 116 surface warships is marginally sufficient for today's requirements within an acceptable level of risk. However, mounting evidence suggests that 116 will not be enough in the future. Certainly the specific numbers and types of ships will be debated. What remains indisputable is the need for *more* ships and aircraft, and more *capable* ships and aircraft than are in the Fleet today, which emerges from every analysis that takes into account the actual experience of recent years and projections of future requirements. Nowhere is this need more compelling than for the Navy's surface combatant force.

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